Energy Taxes and Aggregate Economic Activity by Julio J. Rotemberg & Michael Woodford
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES




Working Paper No, 4576




We would like to thank Jim Costain for his nothing research assistance, Jim Poterba for his
comments and the NSF for research support. This paper is part of NBER's research programs
in Economic Fluctuations and Public Economics. Any opinions expressed are those of the
authorsandnot those of the National thueau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #4576
December1993
ENERGY TAXES AND AGGREGATE
ECONOMIC ACTIViTY
ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the output losses from energy taxes axe significantly larger than
usually computed when due account is taken of imperfect competition among energy using finns.
Even with perfect competition among these firms, the loss in GNP is of the same order of
magnitude as the revenue raised by these taxes. However, in the presence of imperfect
competition the output losses are much higher. There are particularly large transitory losses in
the immediate aftermath of energy price increases when firms act as implicitly colluding
oligopolists. These losses become considerably smaller if energy taxes are phased-in. We also
show that taxes that affect only household consumption of energy have much smaller effects.
In particular, for the empirically plausible parameter values we consider, such taxes have no
effect on employment or output in the non-energy sector.
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and NBER and NBERAs partofhisaddress to a joint session of Congress onFebruary 17, 1993, President Clintonproposed
n broad-based energy tax, as a central part of his plan to reduce the size of the U.S.governmentbudget
deficit. lied this "ETU tax" been enacted, crude oil would eventually have been subject to approximately
a 21% tax, coal to a 25.7% tax and natural gas to a 16% tax. Somewhat lower taxes would have applied
to hydroelectricity sad nuclear power. The political resistance to this energy tax was, however1 intense, and
when the dust settled, all that was enacted was about a 4% tsx on gasoline.
One of the reasons advanced for resiatsnce to the energy tax was concern about its impact on production
and employment in U.S.industry.Indeed, existing studies of the effect of carbon taxes (Goulder (1992,
1993a, 1993b), Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993)) suggest that the reductions in GOP caused by these taxes
arc roiitparahle to the amount of revenue they raise. To demonstrate that this is more onerous than the
cases caused by other taxes, these authors show that GDP still falis substantially even if the revenues from
the carbon tax are used to reduce existing labor income taxes.That energy taxes are an deleterious may
seem surprising, siuce energy consumption is a relatively small fraction of GDP. But the shsre of energy
coats in total costs does not affect the analysis because the small share of spending on energy slso reduces
proportionally the revenue raised by a given sd aderesn tax rate. Neither does our analysis hinge on the
loct that, in practice, other inputs are used to produce energy. Thus the cost of energy taxes we discuss
is unrelated to Diamond sod Mirrleee' (1971) proor that it is inefficient to tax intermediate inputs; energy
is actually a raw material in our model since we neglect extraction costs. Rather the cost of inergy taxes
rcsults from the fact that, unlike other raw materials auth as labor, energy is relatively elastically supplied.
As a result, the quantity of the energy input falla substantially in respouse to a tax, instead of the factor
price simply being forced down.
lii this paper, we argue that the contractionary effects of energy taxes on energy-using industries are even
larger rhan is usually computed, once due account is taken of imperfect competition in those
ii,dsatries. 2 The presence of imperfect competition implies that the price of outpst is above the marginal
tast of production. Thus the social benefit from increasing output by oue unit exceeds the social cost of
'Of course, an appeopriaLely structured nser tax also has s bensitt that otha kieds of Lasss do net. whidc lathe prevision
if a dini,,rrntioe for activities with harn,fuJ rst.ernal rffeeLn. This, rsslser than the ward, far additional souree. sI gevernnsnnt
tin ntatn reason for recent discussion sr "ssxbnn tare.". Prom tl,is paLet or o,rw, a,, snerga Las C555 actually ilepreee
,Ilici'uicy. liecauce we do aoL here attempt an overall evaluation cC the welfare consequences oF en ener Lax, we do sot attwept
to r1teutify uoch ellects. Per an sstenspt Lu do so, ace Goulder (1293b)
7Jsd,J (10931 nl,etcs that imperfect rompetition also affects the optisnal as on capital i,,cuule. lliuasalyeis dtiTe,s frsie ours
I,rcecre rapitat 5ood, see i,,terrnediate inputs whereas we tress esnrg' so a raw e,aterisl.doing so. This wedge implies thatareduction in output has mote deleterious welfare consequences in the
presence of imperfect competition Thus the preexisting distortion due to the lack of perfect competition
raises the welfare costs of any particular output reduction whatever its origin. Wehlarr costs are not out
main focus here, however. We study instead the degree to which output fails and show that this too is larger
with imperfect competition.
The reason is twofold. First of all, imperfect competition implies that the marginal product of any factor,
including energy, exceeds its price. This means that the reductions io energy snd other inputs that result
from energy taxes reduce ONF by more than one would estimate simply based upon these inputs' measured
rust shares.
Secondly, if the tax diange increases the degree of market power of firms in their product markets, they
increase the extent to which they mark up their prises relative tu their marginal costs, whirls results in a
contraction of the equilibrium level of production, just as if a tax on inputs had increased those marginal
rosts. We show that even a very small increase in market power can have a large effect upon the predicted
output decline, because the markup increase is like a tax on all inputs, and not just enargy. We also show
that a pastirular model oF endogenoua markup determination (the model of oligopoliutic pricing previously
used in hIotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1992, 1993)) can imply a temporary increase in market power
lollowing an energy tax increase, though the effect is transitory even in the case of a permanent tax increase.
We also show that this effect is even stronger if one allows fun uncertainty about the permanence of the tax
change.
We also show that allowing for imperfect competition has important consequences for evaluation of the
relative merits of alternatively structured energy taxes. In particular, we show that gradual phase-in of an
energy tax mitigates the rontraetionary effects in the short run, to an even greater extent than revenues are
reduced over that same period; and this effect is even more pronounced when imperfect competition is taken
into account.
Our method is to numerically solve a calibrated general equilihrinrn simulation model, under alternative
iissuniptions shout product market structure. Our model decomposes energy into energy purchased directly
liy households and energy bought indirectly via the pssrrhlase ni-other produced goods. This allows us to
ooalyue chic difference betseeen taxes on all energy use sod taxes on directly roosemed energy.
2This paper is related to Rotemherg and Woodibrd (1993), where we considered the ability of a similar
range of aLternative models to explain the Large declines in U.S. output that followed pre-1980 increases
in the price of oil. We showed that it was easiest to explain these contractions of output, as well as the
sirnullaneous declines in real wages, if one viewed finns as not only hawing market power but as implicitly
collusive. The numerical calibration of the "variable markup' model considered here matches that of the
model shown in the previous paper to best lit the observed effects of oil price shocks. This gives us some
reason to suppose that imperfectly competitive effects of the size assumed in our simulations may actually
be present in the U.S. economy.
Section 1 sets the stage by describing the U.S. energy market. Section 2 discusses the behavior of the
firms that use this energy to produce final output. In this section, we also give an intuitive explanation for
the importance of imperfect competition in determining the output lmaes caused by energy taxes. Section
3 then describes the rest of our simulation model. Sections 4 and 5 then present the model'a numerical
predictions regarding, respectively, the long-run and short-run effects of an unexpected permanent increase
in energy taxes, In section 6 we take up the effect of predicted changes in energy taxes. We thus consider
both the effect of phased-in taxes as well as the effects of taxes that are expected to be repealed. Finally,
section 7 concludes.
1The U.S. ErtcrgyMarket
Fourtypes of products account for the vast bulk of energy consumption. These include coal, natural gas,
petroleum prod acts and electricity. For our purposes, we wish to obtain an energy aggregate. One common
spprriacli is to add together the BTU's contained in all four sources of energy. This would make sense if
tIme products were perfect substitutes in the sense that a BTU from one source is as useful as a BTU from
mmiollmrr. However, in practice, the price per BTU is rather different for different sources of energy. In
particular, it is higher for oil than for coal. For that reason, our aggregate is obtained by adding together
I (mc cx1mrcmditura on these fuur products. This too is strictly appropriate ooly if the products are perfect
smmhsiitmmirs. Ilowever, it allows the IITU's from one source to be less useful than those from another.
TIie maine model of oligopoli.Lic pnnn 1, ahnws in Rotember5 and Wosdford (1901) La be useful in captaining cyclical
,!iu.iniioia in real wages, and in Ftoinrnberg and Wuodlurd 1052) La be useful in nepIainin ike STeeL, of military purdease on
real wagon.
3The aggregation of these four energy sources is complicatedbythefactthatcoal, gasand petroleum
products are used in the geoeration of electricity (though some electricity is also generated from other
sources). It would thus be incorrect to simply add together the values of coal natural gas, petroleum
products and electricity sales. What we do instead is to count only the coal, natural gsa and petroleum
products that are not sold to electric utilities.
Table 1 presents data on the sales of these four products in 1981. Most of coal is used for electric
generation. We valued the 100 million metric tons that are consumed in other sectocs at the average CIF
price paid by electric utilities, namely 930-43 per ton. To value both domestically produced sad imported
crude oil, we used the average import price of $10.54 per barrel. Electric utilities do not use crude oil
directly. Rather, they buy a combination of different petroleum products. Over half of these are made up
of residual fuels whose average price was $18.65 per barrel. We sssigned this price to the entice volume
of petroleum products purchased by electric utilities. Being higher than the price of crude oil, electric
utilities are effectively also purchasing some of the value added of the refining sector. This does not pose
any conceptual difficulties since we add the entice value added of the petroleum and coal products sector to
our aggregate.
in the case of natural gas, we start with the revenues of the industry.We then subtract the gas
purchased by electric utilities using the average price paid by them for natural gas.Einally, we add the
total revenues by electric utilitiee to our aggregate. We conclude that energy consumption in 1989 was equal
to 305.4 Billion dollars, or about 6.6% of CDP. Of this, imported oil accounts for $62.3 billion, or .17 of the
total, and 1.1% of GDP.
We have less accurate data for the breakdown of energy use between direct household use and non-energy
production. In the case of electricity revenue, we know that appcoximately 1/3 comes from residential sales.
In the case of the gas sector, we know that residential sales account for 825.4 billion in 1990, or 40% of
the total revenues counted above, In 001cc of Technology Assessment (1990), total U.S. energy use in 1985
is reported as 74.9 quads (quadrillion BTIJ's), of which 28 quads arc reported for direct household energy
use. This is 37% of the total. Ilowever, government direct use is also reported its 3 qisads, so that uses in
productiou (assuming that all energy use other than the two categories just mentioned should be counted
rramtheSurvey ,,t Currant Buuh,,s
SFmmrite lseiu Annual Enee Survey
4as such) are only 59% of the total. Aseuming that £ of the costs calculated in the previous paragraph are
energy inputs into non-energy production, we obtain energy coats with a value of 4.0% of CDI'. Subtracting
out the 5.5% of CDI' representing value added by the domestic energy industry (6.6% minus1.1%from
above), value added in the non-energy sector reprasents 94.5% of CDI', so that energy costs in thai sector
are 4.2% of value added. The energy sector is thus not an extremely large one. It is thus somewhat surprising
that taxes on the output of this sector have such large effects on aggregate activity.
2Why Imperfect Competition Matters
\Vcshow below that the effects of energy taxes on aggregate activity are much larger when account is taken
of imperfect competition among the firms that purchase energy. In this section we provide some intuition for
this result by considering a simplified modeL Suppose that output is produced with just two inputs, lahor
Handenergy S. In particular, each firm has a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
(I)
where ? is the output of firm i in period 1, while Hand5 represent its labor and energy inputs respectively.
The parameter ft represents a fixed amount of 'overhead" labor needed to carry out any production at all.
-The assumption that there are fixed cents ensures that the production function exhibits increasing returns to
scale in the sense that average costs exceed marginal coats. Our model requires us to assume such increasing
returns to scale. Otherwise, it is impossible to reconcile the gap between price and marginal coat implied by
the ahsence of perfect competition with the apparent absence of pure profits In U.S.industry.
Gieen the production function in 1, the marginal product of energy is oY'/Eor,equivalently, aA[(H
—
fi)1sfl1'°. Under perfect competition, this marginal product i5 set equal to the real price of energy, Z.e.,
to the price nf energy divided by the price of output. But, under imperfect rnmpetltLon, the price of output
is higher relative to marginal cost. In this case one instead obtains
(2)
where p is the ratio of firm l's price to its marginal cost in period 1, and Pci is the real -price of energy
oh- I. Cqnation 2 has two implications, both of which make energy taxes more contrscttonary in the case
ni imperfect competition. First, a high timplies a higher marginal prndurL of energy, given any observedreal energy price. The fact that the marginal product of energy is higher implies that any given reduction
in energy inputs lowers output by more under imperfect competition.
To see this more formally, note that 1 implies that a one percent reduction in Elowersoutput by a
percent. The question is what value should be assigned to a. Under perfect competition, 2 implies that
it squats the energy share paiE4/Y,t,andthis is the usual method of assigning a numerical value to this
parameter. Hut with a markup different from one, the energy share instead equals a/p. Thus a higher
markup implies a higher value for a, and thus a higher elasticity of output with respect to energy, given an
observed energy share (as calculated in the previous section).
This still leaves the question of whether the energy input falla more under perfect or under imperfect
rompetitioo. A second implication of 2 is that, holding employment fixed, the energy input falls more
under imperfect competition. Holding employment fixed is reasonable if one expects labor to be supplied
ioelsstically in the long run. Then 2 implies that a one percent incresse in the price of energy will lead to a
l/(i —a)percent reduction in the deinaud foe energy. This fall is larger the larger is one's estimate of a,
and thus the larger is the departure from perfect competition.
The intuition for this result is the following. Suppose that ooe observes that, with a given amount of
employment, an economy produces 7 units of output with 50 units of energy input. Figure 1 displays two
possible Cobb-Douglas production fuoctiona that could have led to this outcome. In the first a is equal to
0.5, while in the second a is equal to 0.7. They differ in that the marginal product of energy at the observed
level of output is different. The function with n equal to 0.5 might be inferred, given the observed real price
of energy, if one believed that firms are perfectly competitiee, while the function with a equal to 0.7 might
hr inferred under imperfect competition. An important difference between the two fuaetiona is that the one
with a equal to 0.7 is less bowed towards the origin, less concave. The smaller concavity of this function is
dictated by the fact that hoth curves go through the origin and through point A, while the one with a = 0.7
is steeper at. .4. The smaller concavity of the o = 0.7 function implies that a given percentage change in
its alope.r., in the marginal product of energy, must lead to a larger change in the energy input.Thus
imperfect competition implies a larger change in the energy inpul froru a given percentage tax on energy,
0Tlutatthat the curve with a eqsal to 0.7 has both a steeper slope at paint A puts! a ltaLtcr slope at law ealues of tie
energy iepeLimplies tins!the slope ef thi.eureerises bylee.in percentage tenea as oar decreases tl,e energy input lion, point
Ato a low ponittvevalue.
ftgiven observed values foe output, the energy input, and the real price of energy at point A.
Under imperfect competition, the increase in energy taxes also has the potential of raising the equilibrium
markup ,4. it follows immediately from 2 that an increase in the markup will with constant employment,
lead to a further contraction in energy inputs and thus in output. Our simulations below show that in
the case of a model of oligopoliatic collusion, an increase in the energy Lair does cause an increase in the
equilibrium markup. In this case, imperfect competition has an even greater effect on our results.
3A Simulation Model with Imperfectly Competitive Product
Markets
Aswas noted above, our simulation model is similar in structure to the one used in Roternberg and Woodford
(1993)toanalyze the effects of oil price shocks. Some modifications are required, however, for our prsent
purpusse. in particular, our interest in permanent tax changes requires that we take account of the effects of
entry and exit in the long run. We also distinguish here between the use of energy in production and direct
household use of energy.
The production function in our simulation model is murh more general than the one used in the previous
section for illustrative purposes. Like Coulder (1992), we assume that each firm in the private non-energy'
sector produces goods each period with a production function of the form
= Q(V(K,zllfl,G(E,M)) (3)
whereK, and M represent, respectively, firm i's capital and materials inputs at time while z indicates
en ercogenously given labor-augmenting technology factor. The sggregator Q for value added V and the
intermediate input aggregate C is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, as is the aggregator C for
- die intermediate inputs £ and Al. In the competitive case, we also follow Goulder in assuming constant
returns to scale for the value added production function V. However, in the case of imperfect competition,
sed hence output prices higher than marginal cost in equilibrium, constant returns to scale would, again,
imply the existence of pure profits. We do not wish to let such profits exist, at least not in the long-run
stcsdv-siaLe growtlL path. Ileuce in the case of imperfect competition we assume an increasing returns
technology, so that average reata in excess of marginal costs csn recoscile market Jioner with free entry, as
ii Cliaii±erlis's celebrated model of monopolistic competition. As in Itotemberg and \Voodford (1992), we
7rio this by assuming a value added production function of the form
V(K,H)=F(K,H)—'1 (4)
where F is homogeneous of degree one, andis apositiveconstanL (Wemayassume that 4 applies equally
in the competitive case, but with •=0.) The constant t indicates the presence of axed costs (overhead),
while the homogeneity of F implies that marginal costs are independent of scale.
We assume that z1 grows exogessously at a rate g > 0. The tax changes that we consider below will
all be analyzed in terms of perturbations of the equilibrium around a steady-state balanced growth path
that the economy would follow in the absence of the tax changes. Along this balanced-growth path, the
aggregate capital stock, energy inputs materials inputs, and non-energy output all grow at the same rate
g (the exogenous rate of technical progress), while aggregate hours worked remain constant (so that the
effective labor input zHi grows at the same rate as the other factors). 'Inorder icr fixed costs to remain a
constant fraction of total costa along this balanced growth path, it is necessary for us to assume (in the case of
imperfect competition) that the number of firms N1 grows at the same rate g, so that the scale of production
by each firm remains constant. We assume that entry 'a through the introduction of new differentiated
goods, so that the degree of market power of each firm remains the same (again, as in Chamberlin's model).
The details of the process of entry and the conditions needed to rnsure that our steady state with entry has
zero profits are considered in Appendix 1.
We coneider only symmetric equilibria in which the production plane of all firms are identical, so that
= Y1/N1,= E1/N1, and so on, where the vsriables without i superscripts refer to aggregate quantities
for the private non-energy sector. The maximization of profits by these individual firms implies, as before,
that the marginal product of each factor is equal to the product of this factor's real price and the markup
of price over marginal cost. While there are four conditions of this type, tee will maisly be intereated in the
one that is analogous to 2. This condition relates to the marginal product of C and requires that
(5)
where Potisa price index for the aggregate 0r, a'isthe common markup of all firms in a symmetric
equilibrium. The price index PCI depends on the prices of energy and oateriale relative to the price of
'In assrnrteg abalancedgrowth path in which (per capita) hours worked remain constant, or follow numerous pers in
il,erealb,,si,,emcyde literatwe; see, c.., ICise,Finesseandfte5,elo(lose).Swsirs It,c root,iote or pm 10.non-energy output.Ina symmetric equilibriumthe price of this output is the same for allfirms, evenin the
caseof Lmperfect competition, Because each firm's materials are someothernon-energyfirm'soutput, the
price of materials inputs is identicaltothe price of non-energy output. Energy inputs are assumed to be in
perfectly elastic supply at a fixed relative price pg (which we imagine to be fixed on a world market, and
Sn independent of changes in tax policy and production plans in the U.S.). Thus, Pot depends only on the
tax rate on energy, tj, whose effects we wish to analyze. Because we assume that pg is fixed in all of our
experiments below, there is no distinction between the case of an ad valerem tax and a specific tax such as
the BTU tax that was recently proposed.
In our simulations we consider three different types of product market structure for the non-energy
producers. In the case of perfect competition, equations & holds with : = 1 at all times. In our second
model (the "constant markup" model), it holds with j4 = p, a constant greater than 1. at all times. This
corresponds to a model in which firms are monopolistic competitors, with the equilibrium markup bemg
determined by each firms elasticity of demand, which in turn follows from the elasticity of substitution
between the differentiated goods.
Finally in our third and most complicated model (the "veriehle markup" model), we assume that firms
belong touligopolies that maintain high prices thmugh the threat of reversion to low prices if anyone deviata.
ftntemberg and Woodford (1992) show that this implies that the markup j4 for each firm in industry j will
h rcluted to the ratio of expected future profits to current sales. In particular, the markup will be given by
14=u(X/Y/) (6)
wherep(X/Y) Isan increasing function, 17 denotes the common output of each firm in tire industry, and 2ff
dcnotes the expected present value of future profits gross of fixed costs for each firm in the industry assuming
I list collasion is maintained, Iligher expected future profits relative to correct sales raise the expected losses
1mm a breakdown of collusion relative to the potential gains from undercutting the other firms in one's
iiidustry ut the present time. The result is that collusion i5 easier to sustain. Tire formal definition of 2ff
cull he found in Rotcnrberg and Woodfomd (1991) where we explain bow X depends on the poeaibility that
5Tfie ss,taiiptisn ofa constant markupat au (intodotonet actually requfresosssumptisrt that cli' 'mitieldual firni's
Ii'zicuid (Licelasa constant-elasticity teem, us in ilis familiar model of Ijisit and StielJtc (1577). Given ihat we eon.ider only
[lie yroiccLris cqoilibrium, it sul5ees cuss tire utility esseiesd (rum iire differentisLed rends be a homoileetie funcuoa, an that
he ekrsticitr of suhe1itution between different goods izlesp iCe aymeteiris—susaa[srliue iscreie ,rjies'iss putt is caintant. See
Ilstcr,*erg sod Wondfsrd tluul) roe further discuedon oF tIds medsl.uligopolies will either be dissolved or renegotiate their collusive arrangements.
We now describe the rest of our simulation model. To model the supply of labor and capital, we assume
the existence of a representative household that seeks to maximise
E{tU(A(C,,E), Hfl}
whereP is a constant positive discountfactor,C1denoteaconsumption purchases of non-energy output
(Lhat for simplicity we here treat as entirety non-durable), E denotes household direct use of energy, and
I/,' denotes total hours worked (both for the private sector and (or the government). The representative
household is assumed to he a price-taker in all markets, and to face the wage to2 for all hours supplied, and
the after—tax price of pg(l + 1i)forenergy. (in some of our simulations below, we allow the tax on direct
household energy use to differ from the tax on energy inputs to production.) The household also accumulates
the capital stock (the purchase prke of which is the saute aa the price of consumption goods), and receives
the rental rate r1 on its capital holdings; and it owns all firma and receives the profits from both non-energy
and energy production. Capital holdings evolve according to
K14=1+ (1—
thereJareperiod I investment purchases of non-energy output, and 0 < S < 1 is a constant rate of
depreciation.
In order to allow the existence of a balanced growth equilibrium in the case of a constant level of energy
tas, we require as well certain homogeneity assumptions on household prefcrences. Specifically, we assume
that the aggregator function A(C,E)for household expenditure is homogeneous degrei one. We also assume
that the utility function U(A,H) satisfiescertain homogeneity assumptions explained further in Appendix
II. These imply that if the household is faced with a real wage that grows at a rnnstant rate and a constant
rate of return on savings, it will choose to supply a constant number of hours, and to consume a quantity
that growa in proportion to the real wage.
5TI,e aoatampLi000 axe standard is tIne real busiezes cycle literature. See, e.g., Kieg, ?toer and Robeto (1555). AparLfrOm
heir analytical convenience, in allnwrngto analyze a stea.tr-atate balanced growth path deeptte the eanteece of Lerhnical
prugreso and endegeewue labor supply, they are roughly accurate no a dsoaztption ci pest-oar U.S. growth. The meat notable
coij,irical e,oborcassuseut csncenn act the growth of per capita private hours H,, haL per capita Itaura hired by the gcvecnsuent.
which e0hibito a positive trend oeer the post-war peeiod. costraxy to the assumption of ear o,adcl below. Needlene to say,
adequately dealing with the growth of the goeentseent eerter atarreed over this period, ii take,, to reprereet a genuine Ieng-rmt
rc,Ld, wovild ho incompatible with the enistence of balanced growth.
13As noted above, we assume that the supply of energy is infinitely elastic so that the relative price at
which energy is supplied is fixed exogenously. This is probably not strictly correct. However, the view that
the elasticity of supply is large is justified to some extent by the fact the price of oil is determined in a
world market where the 11.5. consumes only a quarter of world output. 15 Thus, even assuming that Ibreign
demand is inelastic, the elasticity of supply faced by the U.S. is four tienes the world elasticity of supply. las
addition, the foreign elssticity of demand also renders the effective supply of energy to the U.S. more price
elastic. Put differently, any reduction in price brought shout by a reduction in U.S.consumptionwould raise
consumption elsewhere and thereby dampen the required fall in price. The result is that, even if the elasticity
oF the world supply of oil is zero, the effective elasticity of supply for the U.S. would equal three times the
[ elasticity of demand of all the other nations. On the other hand, we abstract here from considerations of
international trade by supposing that all U.S. energy usage (the sum E1 + Efl is supplied by 11mw that are
owned by the same representative household referred to above.We also ignore for simplicity the use of
factor inputs in energy production, and treat the revenues of the energy sector as pure rents (distributed as
profits to the representative household).
We do take account of the consumption of real resources by the government, although in our simulations,
goeernment demand is assumed to simply grow deterrninistically with the rest of the economy. Specifically,
sass me an exogenously given path for real government purchases of non-energy output (C,). In order to
make possible a balanced growth path, we assume that C, grows at the rate g of labor-augmenting technic-si
progress. lYe similarly assume an exogenously given path for government purchases of people's time. In
order to make possible a balanced-growth path of the kind described above, we assume that the hours per
capita purchased by the government arcs constant, ff5, at all times. We also assume that lump-sum taxes
or tranniers make up for any discrepancy in a given period between the value of government expenditure
C, + w1JI9andthe value of energy tax revenues r(E, + E'). This allows us to consider the effects of a
change in the level of energy taxes while abstracting from the effects of changing other distorting taxes or
ol changing govcrsnaent espenditure patterns. Market clearing in the non-energy sector then requires that
°l,, 1950. the U.S. consumed 14.al ,nillion barrels of oils day while world production equaled ascIi million barrel, a day.
'lIe ,lü assume in camputinç predicted c],an500 in CUP titan some of the e,wegy i, daissillod 5w 'foreign" output rue poepa
1 tIe ,atinvol incon,e account,, bat this is treated a, 01' sccouoLin convention with no ecoitoilus significance. See equationS
11at each time
(7)
whilemarket clearing in the labor market requires that
111+Hf_—11' (8)
Inour numerical simulations, weconsiderthe comparative dynamics associatedwith deterministic per-
turbationsof the expected time path of the energy tax {r1). In the case of perturbations that are small
enough, the effects are entislly linear in the percentage tax change. The magnitude of these linear effects
can he obtained from a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions of the model. We carry out
this linearization around the long-run steady-state balanced growth path to which the economy eventually
con verge& This allows us to state our results in terms oF the percentage changes in non-energy output sod
so on per percent increase intheenergy tar.italso means that the parameter values required in order to
obtain numerical results are simply elasticities of the various functions introduced above, and average values
of the various quantities. The parameter values used in our simutations are listed in Table I The sources of
these numerical values, as well as the interpretation of the parameters, are discussed further in Appendix II.
In our basic simulation, we consider the effects of an permanent increase in the energy tax r, that is
announced (unexpectedly) at the same time that it takes effect. 'iVe assume that the economy had previously
converged to the steady-state halaoced growth path associated with tlje previous level of the energy tax (zero),
and consider the path by which it converges to a new long-run steady state following the change. We also
consider, for purposes of comparison, en experiment in which only the tax rate on direct household use of
energy is increased, with no change in the tax on uses of energy as an input to non-energy production. In
this case, the relative price of energy inputs in production continues to be pw, while the relative price of
energy for household use becomes pw(i + r). This comparison is of interest because the gasoline tax that
was eventually passed as part of the 1994 Budget is, effectively, a tax that falls disproportionately on the
energy purchased by households. It is thus of interest to compare the elfect of such a tax to those of a more
broad-based tax, such as the BTIJ tax originally proposed by President Clinton. An might be expected we
will show that imperfect competition increases the output losses associated with an energy tax snlp in the
case of a tax on tIre use of energy in production. The reason is that imperfect coiripetition aifeets the degree
12to which output falls only by affecting the energy purchasesoffirms.
4Long-Run Effects of a Permanent Energy Tax
Table 3 summarizesthe changes in the long-run levels ofseveral variables for eachof four cases. The two
types of tax changes considered are a shift from rero energy talc to a 1% tax on all energy use, (first two
columns) ' and a shift from no energy tax to a 1% tax on the direct use of energy by households (last two
columns), assuming no tax on industrial uses of energy. Each tax chssge is considered foe two alternative
assumptions about product market structure. In the "competitive" case (left column of each pair), we
assume perfect competition (i.e., p = 1). In the "market power" case (right column of each pair), we sssume
imperfectly competitive product markets, with the typical firm possessing market power sufficient to lead it
to set prices 20% higher than its marginal cost of production in the steady-state equilibrium (it, p = 1.2).
As was noted above, our specification of a value for the steady-state markup p also determines our
specification of the degree of increasing returns in the production technology. In the "competitive" case,
we assume constant returns to scale ( = 0). In the "market power" case, we assume the existence of
increasing returns due to the presence of fixed costs (4'> 0), sad endogenous determination of the. number
of firnis (and hence varieties of differentiated goods). Thus in this case there exist increasing returns such
that average cost is 20% higher than marginal cost for the typical firm in the stesdy7state equilibrium. All
other parameters are calibrated in the same way is the two cases.
One issue that arises at this point is whether a markup of 1.2 is reasonable. There are essentially two
sources of inlormation on this psremeter. The first sterns from the large literature which attempts to measure
the elasticity of demand facing individual products produced by particular firms. This literature is relevant
because it is never profit maximising for a firm to set its markup lower than one over one plus the inverse of
the elasticity of demand for its product. Them are many estimates of the elasticity of dumsud for particular
products is the marketing literature. Tellis (1988) surveys this literature, and reports that the median
iircas'irrd price elasticity is just under 2. Thus the markup would equal at least 2 if this sample of firms is
rcprcseststive. In prattice, elasticities of demand undoubtedly differ across products and the elasticity of
dt'iiiuiid of those products studied in the marketing literature is probably atypically low, lids is because the
2Altlissgh we a"sa.me here as isitial steady staLe siLt nu ansrgy Las, rIse result, would he ,'nsit",' in the case of • 5% masses
ii, il,c val,,s otli + "1. stsrsin5 From a positive miLLs] Las.
tamarketing literature focuses on the demand for branded consumer products which are more differentiated
lien unbrasded products so that their demand is probably less price sensitive. Thus, the typical product in
the ecorionw probably baa a price elasticity of demand that exceeds 2.
A second approach is to analyze what happens to revenue and costs in response to an exogenous change
in aggregate demand. A particularly simple version of this approach has been proposed by Hall (1988, 1990).
lIe studies the degree to which the increase in GDP generated by increases in exogenous variables aurh as
changes in military purchases is acrompanied by an increase in costs. Insofar GDP increases by more than
costs, the markup is greater than one. His estimates indicate that the markup p is between 1.4 and 1.6. '
There is also a related literature which tries to obtain econometric estimates of marginal cost and, in some
cases, combine theni with econometric estimates of the elasticity of demand. The aim of this approach is to
obtain simultaneous, independent estimates of the markup and of the degree of increasing returns. Morrison
(1990), for example, estimates a flexible functional form cost function, using data on gross industry output
and materials inputs. Her estimates of that markup p range between 1.2 and 1.4 for 18 ont of ber 18
industries. One notable feature of these estimates is that her industry estimates of the ratio of average
to marginal cost closely resemble her estimates of the markup itself. Thus the relation between these two
parameters that we imposed through our zero profit condition appears to be validated.
Because a's are considering only long-run effects, the reeults do not depend on whether the tax increase is
immediate or phased in over a period of time; only the eventual permanent inccen-se in the tax rate mat tees.
Similarly the results do sot hinge on whether the long-run substitutability of factors of production exceeds
their sliorL-run substitutability; only the long-run substitution possibilities matter here.
Furthermore, the "market power" ease reported in Table 3 refers equally to the mosopolistically corn-
petitive model and to the ohigopolietic collusion model. The reason is that is neither ease does the energy
tax change have any effect on the markup of prices over marginal cost in the long-run steady stats. In
the case of monopolistic competition, the markup is predicted to be a. constant, determined solely by the
elasticity 0f substitution between alternative differentiated goode. In the oligopolistir model, by contrast,
the markup depends opon the ratio X/)', and so can vary is response to policy changes. However, in a
3111. epnrted epsimaja fur snarhaps are actually even higher.Theerases is Lilat he sstimates 'vulue-addeS' markups as
opposed Is the asses standard markups of prier ever Lotci n,sr5n,al reaL. For a disoucsia,, of the relation between the twa, see
andWaudfued (asso).
14steady-state equilibrium, the present discounted value of profits X is proportional toY. Moreover1 while the
steady state value of X also depends on the steady-state real rate of interest, r, this real rate of interest is
solelydeterrniiied by preference parameters and theexogenous rate of growth (see Appendix II). Hence the
steady-state r is unaffected by the energy tax, as a result of which steady-state s is also unaffected. Thus
the Long-run effects are the same in either type of imperfectly competitive model; all that matters is the abe
of the steady-state markup z.
We now turn to the numerical results reported in Table 3. In each row1 the figure reported represents the
percenlege change in the long-run value of that variable resulting from a 1% energy tax. (In our log-linear
approximation to the equilibrium, the effects of a k% energy tax are obtained by multiplying each of these
tiumbers by L) The variables, of course, grow over Lime in the steady-state equilibrium; but the steady-state
growth rate is unaffected by the energy tax (as it is determined solely by the exogenous rate of technical
progress). Thus the figure -071 for non-energy output means that output is -.071 percent lower at all times
than it otherwise would have been, in the new long-run steady-state growth path. "Non-energy output"
refers to the grras output Y,ofthe energy-using (but not energy-producing) sector. The change is "GDP"
is computed as
AZ—AFJ, — pzAEr+0"'"p5(AE,+ AE) (9)
where<1 indicates the difference (net percentage difference) in value of the equilibria between the perturbed
aiid unperturbed equilibria, and 0°"' dcnotes the share of energy used in the U.S. that is domestically
produced. 4 Thus the (JDP measure aggregates value added in the non-energy sectnr and the domestic
energy-prorineirlg seclor, where for simplicity the total revenues of the latter sector are counted as value
added. :llo5m seorked denotes total hours worked H1;becausegovernment hours are assumed to follow an
exogenous path unaffected by the energy tax, the reported decline in hours is only 83% of the aice of the
decline iii hours in the private non-energy sector. The "product wage" refers to the wage deflated by the
price of sue-energy input (i.e.,. the quantity or, in equation (3a)), while the "consumption wage" refers to




' hnpliriLle, ae sssuxse I,e,, LILOL U.S. eswg3r pnsdLletion eerie, in the san,e proportion so U.S. energy use."Energy use in production", "capital stock' and "number of firms" refer to the variables E1, K1, and N1
introduced in the previous section; all refer solely to the private non-energy sector. The number of firms is
indeterminate in the competitive model,
A striking feature of the results in Table 3 i5 that a tax that is levied only on direct household purchases
of energy has no effect sslnstsseveron equilibrium activity in the private non-energy sector. Household energy
use falls, and the consumption wage falls because theprice indexPA rises. However, the household does not
change its supply of labor or demand (or non-energy goods, nor does the equilibrium product wage in the
iLon-energy sector change. GDP falls only because of the reduction in domestic energy production due to
red uced household use of energy. is
Two features of our model account for this result. The first is that we made assumptions that ensured the
existence of a steady state where the economy grows but hours worked do not. Since output, consumption.
energy psrchnses and wages all grow at the same rate in such a steady state, we require that eqrsipcoportional
increases in wages and the aggregate i = A(C1,E) be consistent with an unchanged quantity of labnr
supplied.A permanent increase in the tax on household energy raises PE(1+r1) and thus raises the
consumption deflator pAlwhileit lowers the consumption wage. As long as A1 falls in exact proportion to
the increase in p.. while the product wage is unaffected, the (all in the real wage and in consumption are
equiproportional so the quantity of labor supplied does not change.
The second important source of this result is our assumption that the household's claaticity of suhstitution
hetween non-energy consumption and direct energy use is equal to 1. We hese this on the unit elasticity of
demand estimates of Houthakker, Verleger, and Sheehan (1974). This rneasa that the shares of household
oxpenditure on energy and non-energy outpst will remain constant in the face ofa change in the relative price
of these tiro kinds of goods. But supposing that the path of p51A1 is unchanged under the ciccunwtances
pistdescribed,It fellows that the paths of C1 and of vs(1 + r1)E are unchanged. Thus household energy
rise falls iii inverse proportion to the tax increase, while non-energy consumption demand and labor supply
ore irticlisuged. TIns means that, if the product wage and the real rate of rrurn are unaffected, consumption
demand and labor supply are unchanged so that output in the non-energy secLor can remain constant as
'"Gc,iilder19mb,alsu reporLarnallerlosses in ClIPfir LaneLhaL atTest onlyhouselield's in 01 eeeru.
'6Toohmic LL,h rcrulL se asasmethatthe Friast, sensu.spLis'Odressed ruroc and LIreEriasli labor'°nnty mccc eaLtefy reetaiu
1.u.uogeneity preperticecaptained is Appendis II.
16well. TLiis iu turn implies that the previous paths of the product wage s-nd Lhe real rate of interest continue
to describe an equilibrium. This argument applies whether there is perfect competition or not since the two
iriodels differ only in the way non-energy firms react to changes in their environment. But, as we just saw a
Lax on household use of energy does not sHeet this environment.
Since Llie tax on household direct use of energy has no effect on non-energy output, the effects on output
of a tax on all energy are due to the tax on the industrial use of energy. The effects would have been just
as large if osip the energy used in production were taxed. it is true that the result of exactly zero effect of
Lhe tar on direct household use depends upon particular psrsmeter chokes that might well he challenged.
however, for any values near ours, the result will still be approximately true — the effects of a tax on household
energy use will be much smaller than the effects of a tax on industrial uses, and indeed the eRects of a tax
ciii household energy use could as easily be expansionary as contractionary. Thns the shift from a "BTU
tax" to s gasoline tax in the budget that was eventually psssed by the U.S. Congress probably resulted in
a Lax that places less of a burden on the economy, per dollar of revenue raised. Another implication is that
iii designing s tax intended to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, a tax aimed more at household energy use
is likely to contract economic activity lass, for any given reduction in emissions that is achieved, than one
hosed simply on the 'carbon content" of various foels.
Now consider the effects of s tax on all types of energy use. Private non-energy production contracts, as
do hours work-ed, the energy used in production, the capital stock and the real wage deflated by the price of
sos-energy output. The contraction in hours stands in contrast to the case of a tax on energy consumption
ools It conies about because a Lax on all energy lowers the consumption wage by more than it towers A1.
Thelahie-showsthat CUP falls by slightly more than does non-energy output in this ease. The reason is
hat the contraction of the energy sector in even more severe, in percentage terms, than the contraction of
hr prftsce non-energy sector. In the imperfectly competitive case, there is also a reduction in the long-run
number ni lirnis, dse to exit in response to profits no longer large enough to cover the fixed costs.
iii the competitive case, the ouLput losi as a result of the energy tax is rather significant. Since the
uliore oF lotal energy expenditure its GDP is 0-066, a one percent tax increase raises government revenues
lv oiili .flffli percest of GD!'. On the other hand, CUP is itself reduced (in the long roll) by 1171 percent.
17The ratio of output loas to revenue raised is even more severe if one considers the case of a pure tax on
industrial uses of energy. In this case, a one perrent energy tax raises government revenues by only .040
percent of GD?, while GD? is reduced by .050 percent.
lInt the contractionary effects of an energy tax are even greater when one allows for imperfect competition.
In the case of market power, the long-run decline in non-energy output is .091 percent and the long-run
decline in GD? is .098 percent. Thus even a relatively modest degree of market power (prites 20% above
marginal cost) eignillcantly increases the predicted effect of the energy tax; the long-run non-energy output
decline ie increased by a factor of nearly 1.4+
The reason for this can be understood by analyzing equationS in the same way that we analyzed equation
2 in section 2. It follows from 5 that a value p > 1 implies a higher estimate of the elasticity of the aggregator
Qwithrespect to C. Using the shares reported in Table 2, the implied value of this elasticity is increased
from +52 to .624 (a factor of 1.2) by raising p to 1.2. The elasticity of Qwithrespect to V similarly falls
from .48 to +316+ Furthermore, as in section 2 the higher value of p implies that the fall inis larger in
response to a change in the price PaItturns out that, for fixed V, the fall in C is inversely proportional to
the elasticity of Qwithrespect to V, and thus is larger by a factor of 1+28 when p = 1.2. Thus, auppcaing
that the index of primary inputs V were not affected by the energy tax, C would have to fall by 1.28 times
as much, and so output would fall by 1.53 (1.2x 1+28) times as much, in the case of market power. In
[art, the difference between the output declines in the two cases is not so extreme in our simulations. This
is because V actually falls more in the long run in the competitive case. Nonetheless, the contraction is
significantly larger in the presenre of market power.
The energy tax also has significantly greater adverse rffects in the case of market power in several other
respects as well. For example, the real product wage falls by more than 1.5 times as much in percentage
t7TIiio ratio of the output lose to thereeenueraiced iscomparableto what is implied by the results of sUrerauthors. For
rsameple, Goulder (1992) estimatse that a $25 (in 1990 prices) per ton tao on carbon esntset will reducerealGNP in 2020 by an
awnnnLthat cariesbetween it percent and 1+14 percent, depending upon the strusture of the tax (see his Table 7). Using Lbs
figures iahisTable I we the percentage tax that this corresponds to for different types er fuel, one find, that this sercaspnnds
us cc sceroge tan rate se energy ow of 14.1%, as that the recesses raised should be only apprsxinentely .96 percent aCGN?,
i505,155the red,ustinna in the cost shareef energy that should fallow from tush asorer,Las, Cloulder (lssab), on the
.,Ll,erhand, reportssmaller0741° losses. lieconsiders a tao sf41rants perndllien BTU'a whir], corresposda roughly to a 27%
asno energy and tomputea a reduction in CNP siardya tl,i,sl of nne percent. By roetrastourestimates would imply thai a
22% ma would leadtoGDPlsaa of 1.5 percont.
'tNoe-suusrgy coutpst still falls hr .971 percent in this case, hut he eeergy sector contracts to a Inns1, amaller eateet. Total
"Ilergysolesarc affectedmerebya tooon lssosrlmld energy ma tliae by a tax en industrialuses, hecanse our calibration impliaa
I ratenergy is more substitutable fur other goads icr benasl,elde sIms for urn,,.
18terms. Thisindicates a more significant contraction oflabordemand; theonlyreasonthat hoursworked do
not fall itore is that householdsacewilling to accept the lower real wage because of their lower wealth in
this case.
5 Short-Run Effects of Changes in Tax Policy
liithis sectionwe begin the more complex analysis of the short-run effects of changes in policy. We focus
hereon the transition to a new long-run steady state consistent with a new permanent tax rate. During this
transition the effects of tax rate changes differ depending on whether markups are constant or not. We thus
consider separately our two models of imperfect competition.
We consider here an unexpected permanent increase in the energy tax rate r from zero to .01 that takes
effect immediately. Since the tax change is not anticipated in advance we suppone the economy starts out
in the steady-state balanced growth path associated with zero energy taxation. We imagine that the tax
applies to all uses of energy, although as explained in the previous section, the effects of the tax on the
ton-energy sector follow solely from the taxation of energy used as an input to non-energy production. iS
Figure 2 displays the transitional effects on non-energy output, under the three alternative specifications
of product market structure. The vertical axis indicates percentage deviations from the previous steady-state
growth psth;—lO i l0 means a reduction of .10percent.The horieontal axis indicates the year; year 0
is the year is which the tax change is announced and takes effect. In the competitive case, the tax lowers
eon-energy output by .011 percent in the long-run as we showed in Table 3. We now see the short-run effects
as well. In the first year, non-energy output is already reduced by .058 percent. In subsequent years, output
continues to lall further below the previous trend path, as the capital stock is eroded; hut a large part of the
ecentusl output decline occurs immediately. in the case of the constant markup model, the general pictore
is similar. But, as the elasticity of output seith respect to energy inputs is larger in this case, the decline in
outpnt is larger both in the short run and in the long eon.
In like cs-se of the variable markup model, tie long con effects are the sante as for tie constant markup
ITlodcl.Asexplained in the previous section, both models predict a long-run reduction of non-energy output
al-earnestmade abort chews that in the caseelan immediate,permanentlas en direct haneehald energy use eaiy, the
"m-Ql,anwill isancdia(elyj',wp as erw steady-staLe balancederawtl.psalm dacribed ii, Tables. TIaatL,eeeis no effectupon
miomi-emmeegycarat, consumption, amidso as.in eithertheshort runorthelane run.by .097 percent. However, the short run effects are quite different. During the first year of the energy tax
the cnnstant markup model predicts a reducUon by .083 percent, while the variable markup model predicts
a reduction by .123 percent. The predicted short run effect is almost one and one-half times as large (and
thus is more than twice the sise of the effect in the cnmpetitive model). This is because the variable msrkup
model predicts that the markup incresses when the energy tax is increased, and then gradually returns to
its original level over time. The markup increases because the ratio X/Y increases. This occurs, in the
first instance, because of a decline in real interest rates that results from the reduced returns to capital
(which eventually return to normal as the capital stock isreduced).Lower real interest rates mean that the
expected future profits from collusion are discounted to a lesser extent, making s greater degree of collusion
possible. higher markups then themselves contribute to a higher ratio of profits to sales each period, making
X/Y still higher and so helping to raise markups further. Higher markups also further reduce the returns to
existing capital goods. Thus lowers real rates of return further, thus further raising XJY and further raising
markups in a self-reinforcing process.
In our simulation, the markup increases hy .011 percent during the first year of the Lax (i.e., om 1.2000
to 1.2001). Even this small increase in the inefficiency wedge due to firms' market power has a significant
effect on the predicted equilibrium allocation of resources. To understand this, it is helpful to suppose first
that labor supply is inelastic. Then, V1 is entirely As a result, S determines U as a function of (rt,,u1).
Then,using 3, Y1 depends only on (rip1).Nowlet us investigate for a given increase in ri, the quantitative
effect of a an increase in pt.Becauseenergy coats are only about 4% of total intermediate inpuL coals,
a one percent increase in the alter-tax energy price raises the price index Patbyonly .04 percent. Thus
a contemporaneous .011 percent increase in the markup means that the right hand side of 5 increases by
1.3 times as much (in percentage terms) as it wnuld in the ease of a cdnstant markup. In our log-linear
spprnximatinn to the solution, the percentage decline in }'isproportional to the percentage increase in the
right Load side of 5, and so it should be t.3 times as large in the variable markup case.
In our simulation model, we also allow for endogenous lahor supply. rr Ia this ease, households reduce
Inhor supply rather than accept a real wsge cut of the sire that would be required to induce firms not to
25Notr sites it it nat essestisi to cur ranriasiess here that this be i,sterpretrd as 'voluntary" variation in labor supply.
Q,,aI,tatit'elyai,,iilaruaudoaiaas would In otaaiae,5 its thrraceof aJy aaun,r oraliart-ra,, esal wage rigidity",due for example
Lu pre-euixLio wagecontrast. Sto efiluienerwage euneideraLiono.
20reduce the labor inputs that they use. Thus non-energy output falls even more than it would in the ease of
inelastic labor supply- This effect ra present regardless of product market structure. However, one can easily
see that the real wage decline required to induce firms not to reduce labor inputs is larger if the markup
rises. For it follows from 5 that if the markup rises, the value of C1 falls more, and hence that Qy(Vg,Qi)
for fixed labor and capital inputs lills more. On the other band; the same logic that leads to S implies that
the real wage must equal QVVH/IJ..Thefall in the real wage is thus nnsgnified both by the increase in p
and by the severity in the fall of Qv - It thus makes sense that in the cane of endogenous labor supply, the
effect of the markup increase on output is even greater. It is the fact that such small changes in the markup
can matter so much for the size of the predicted effects of the tax increase that leads us to insist upon the
importance of product market structure for tax analyses of this kind.
6The Effect of Expected Changes in Energy Taxes
Upto this point we have considered the effect of unanticipated permanent increases in energy taxes. There
are several reasons, however, for energy taxes to be anticipated. First, there is a time gap between the
moment where tax policy is announced and when it takes effect. In particular, the Clinton proposal cslled
foragradual phase-in of the BTU tax. Second, tax changes ste not necessarily permanent. Any particular
tsx, such as the energy tax has some probabiLity of being repealed in the future.
\/e start by considering the case of gradual phase-in. We thus report simulations in which the energy
tax is increased by one-half of one percent in the year that it is announced while the full one percent tax
applies from the second year onward. The comparison with the case of an instantaneous increase in the tax
is iiiteresting in part because a gradual phsse-in was actually proposed. Moreover, as wewill show, the effect
nI this gradual phase-in depends even more crucially on product market structure than the eventual effect
ala permanent tax.
The consequences for nan-energy output are ahown in FigureS, for each of the possible market structures.
As like iinglit expect, output falls by less in the first year than if the full tax were to take immediate effect.
lii lad, in none of the models is the contraction in the first year even half the sire indicated in Figure 1. In
lie cnse of the competitive model, the first-year decline in non-energy output is only .016 percent; in the
rnsstant markup model, it is only .012 percent; and in the variabLe markup model, output does not decline
21at all in the first year, but instead rises by .011percent
One reason for the first year effect to be so muted is that the wealth effect on laborsupply, which tends
to increase equilibrium output, is nearly as large in these aimulations as in the previous onus. On the other
hand, the current increase in energy casts, which tends to reduce equilibrium output, is only half as large.
The other important factor, in the case of the variable markup model, is that expectations of future profits
are reduced nearly as much as in the previous simulations, while current sales are reduced by much luss tnis
meaue that the ratio XJY falls, so that the equilibrium markup istempocacily reduced in the oligopolistie
model. The path of the equilibrium markup in the oligopolistic model is shown its Figure 4,furthe cases of
the ittuncdiately effective tax and the phase-in over a one-year period. Is the case of the gradual phase-in,
the markup falls by about .004 percent ftc.,,from 1.2 to 1.19995).
After die first year, the path of output in these simulations is similar to the one we derived for an
immediate tax increase. The only difference is that the higher output in year 0 is associated with a higher
level of investment. Thus the capital stock in year 1 is higher. Iii fact the economy sow begins year 1 with a
slightly larger capital stock than in the original balanced-growth path in all cases. By contrast, the capital
stock was slightly lower in each of our previous simulations. In the case of the competitive model and the
constant markup model, the higher capital stock means that the output decline in year 1 and later is not
cjuite ss large as in the previous simulations. On the other hand, in the case of the variable markup model,
we find that a higher capital stock actually makes the output decline even more severe. The higher capital
stock implies that real interest rates are even lower. This implies that X/Yiseven higher and thus leads to
even higher markups. Figure 4 shows that, indeed, the markups in year 1 and later are actually greater in
I lii' mae nf a plia-ced—irs tax.
Finally, we report simulations in which the tsx increase is not expected to permanent. We now suppose
lint the csx is increased to 1% on all uses of energy, but that it is anticipated that each year there is a 20%
probahihity that the tax rate will be permanently restored to its original value. In our dynamic equilibrium
eiodel,tlte effects of a tax increase cannot he analyzed independently of expectations about future policy,
and it is important to realize that economic agents need not expect that a tax change is permanent simply
I lie bill that is enacted does not specify a future date at sehich it becomes invalid. here too we
find that the effects of as expectation of future policy reversal depend greatly upon our assumptione about
22product market structure.
Figure 5 presents the time path of non-energy output in the case of the three pcesible marketstructures.
Here what is plotted for each year is the level of non-energy ouLput in thaI year relative to the previous
rind growth path assuming that there has been no reversal of the tax up until that time. to the case of
both the competitive model and the constant markup model, the contraction of non-energy output is greater
than it would have been were the tax expected to continue forever. This is due to the wealth effect on labor
supply; optimism about reversal of the tax makes households expect higher future incomes end thus makes
them less willing to work in the present. This demonstrates that the coutnactionary effects of energy taxes
nay, in practice, be considerably greater than those indicated in Figure
25
in the case of the variable markup model, things are more complex. It is again true that the expectation
cii a poasilile reversal lowers first period output beeastae of the wealth effect on labor supply. ilowever, the
posaihility of a policy reversal also raises the eqnilibrium real rate nf return, because higher rental rates on
capital are expected in the event of repeal of the tax. This higher rate of return lowers the present discounted
value of future profits relative to current revenues. The resulting reduction in X/Ylowersequilibrium markup
in the oligopolistic model. While the markup still rises following enactment of the tax, it does not rise as
iiiiicli irs iii tho simulation depicted in Figure 1. And, sssuming that the tax has not yet been repealed,
ilir equilibrium markup from yeas 3 onward in the oligopoilntie model is actually losven than that iu the
innnopolistically competitive model. This occurs because, once the capital stock has fallen sufficiently below
Is initial lcvel, the real rate of return remains consistently above the real rate associated with the initial
steady state. The consequence is that if. contrary to expectation, the tax continues for many yeare, output
art nails Itigher in the oligopolistic model than in the monopolistically competitive model.
7Conclusions
\\cli;icc found that alloseing for imperfect competition in product markets has an important quantitative
clicci on estimates of the effects of energy taxes on the level of economic activity. Allowing for even a modest
;uicri'gC markup ni prices over marginal cost increases the predicted decline in output which is caused by an
21T1,r,re ace oilier r0000ncwlirurisrni&rapseL tire stirsurlus to labor supply from tue soysctaiiosr of lore future incomes
riot Lu lie or lai5e as is rise simulatiana depicted in Figure 1. Ear essnrple uric nrigtrL .irppe Lirat seine ropplisse of labor ass
'rr,vI'le La borrow sgsiost future income iii any event. In such a ease, the eentrsctiourary effects of an errer' tss an likely Ia
Iorerr burr Liner iiolicared is those simulations.
23iiirie;ise ii tire after-tax relative price of energy inputs. And allowing for even a small increase in equilibrium
macimps, due to increased suatainahility of collusion among members of an oligopoly can greatly increase
tire predicted nuLput decline.
We have paid particular attention to a specific model of oligopolisticcollusion that we have elsewhere
arguedhelps to explain the responses ofthe U.S. economyto a variety of kinds of macroeconomic shocks. This
model implies that an increase in energy taxes may well temporarily raise equilibrium markups. aspecially
when it is both nuexpected and expected to be reversed soon with significant probability. In this case, the
'iluort-ririL coirtractionsry impact of air energy tax is especially large. This effect is, however, sensitive to the
precise dynamic specification of the proposed taxes. Markups in the oligopolistic model may fall rather than
risrng immediately following announcement of an energy tax increase if there is a delay io the implementation
of the tax.
In general, our results suggest an even less favorable rdation between the revenues raised by an energy tax
raid tIre reduction of economic activity than earlier studies (assuming competitive markets) have indicated.
lor cxaiiiple, in tire case of immediate implementation of a 1% energy tax that is expected to be reversed
erich' year with a 20% probability1 the revenues raised in tire first year of the tax will be .066 percent of
GDP, while CDI' is itself reduced by .110 percent in the first year according to the constant markup model,
aid Iw .112 percest according to the variable markup model. The CDI' reduction five years later is only
.008 percent in the variable markup model if, contrary to expectation, the ta.'c increase has riot yet been
reversed; but it is by that time .134 percent in the constant markup model. Although we do not here analyze
alternative revenue sources, nyc believe that su energy tax is relatively unattractive on this dimension.
Our results also suggest ways in which an energy tax might be structured to minimize tire contractionaey
elfecls. Our roost important finding in this respect is that a tax solely on direct household use of energy
teed rot contract non-eneegy production at all. insofar as allowing for imperfect competition increases
Ike predicted ccsntraetionary effects of a Lax on industrial uses of energy, but does not affect the predicted
rnilecqucsces or a tax on direct hosseliold use, it makes the case for targeting household energy use even
stronger.
Time short-run coritractionary impact of an energy tax is also reduced if the tax is phased in gradually,
nod our sintulationu indicate that the outpat gained in the transition period is macli largee than Lhe cevenue
24Losses due to the gradual phase-in.In thecase thatweanalyzehere,forexample,gradual phase—in invcslv a
revenue loss el .023 percent of GDP in the fIrst year relative to the revenues from immediate implementation.
hut hr result is that GDP falls by .070 percent less in the case of constant markups equal to 1.2, and by
.109 percent less in the case of the variable markup model. In the case oftheconstant markup model, the
output loss is eiso somewhat mitigated in later years although it is made slightly worse in the case of the
variable marksp model.
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27Appendix I
Entry and the Elimination of Profits
We have stated above that in the long run, entry and exit are assumed to maintain pare profits at zero.
It is straightforward to show that the first order conditions for profit maximization imply that pure profits
are zero in a symmetric equilibrium if and oniy if
(Pr —i))'=Qv(l'r,G(Er,MiDNr'i (ii)
w Liere ji,denotesthe common markup of all ñrms. Equation ii would thus determine the equilibrium number
of firms each period in the case of instantaneoue entry and exit. This equation refers only to the case of
imperfect competition and increasing returns where p exceeds one and 'isstrictly positive. Otherwise, as
ssual with constant ietuens, the number of firms is indeterminate.
We do not, however, suppose that entry and exit occur so quickly. Because entry and exit are peripheral
to our main interests here (and because, as long as they are slow, the exact dynamics do not matter much
for our results) we adopt a simple ad hoc specification rather than explicitly modeling the entry and exit
decisions. Let us define
lima(i + g)E1 {Qv(%+:,C(a,A+a))} (12)
Tliss N1 denotes the number of firms needed at date tiia constant rate of growth g of the number of
irms ever alter is to result in zero profits in the long run. We then assume that the number of firms grows
'xogcnoiisly ul.therate p. except for a slow tendency to correct any discrepancy between the current number
iiiil .,.SpeciicaIl,we assume dynamics for the number of firms giveu by
N1=pN1-l-(i—p)(l+y)N1_1 (la)
where 0 c p 51is a consiant partial-adjustment rate. This specification introduces an additional predeter-
mined state variable, in addition to the aggregate capital stock K1, aad that is the previous number of firms
ficie Lust oncethereceases to he new information about future policy, N1 grows at the constant rate
so that 13 implies thai the percentage discrepancy betweea Is'1 and N1 is eliminated at an exponential rate.
Substitution of 12 aud comparison with 11 indicates then that the share of pure profits in total revenues
''Lest asvinpIotictslly approach zero, irs desired.
28Appendix II
ParameterValuesUsed in Simulations
here we explainthenumerical values reported in Table 1. The steady-state balanced growth path of
the economy is described by a set of growth rates and shares, that we calibrate using the 15.5. national
income accounts According to our model, the exogenous rate g of labor-augmenting technical proggess is
also the steady-state rate of growth of real GD?, which is why we assign the value .03/year. The parsmeter
represents the real rate of return in the steady-state equilibrium. This is not a primitive of the model,
but the model predicts that it should equal Ø(1 + g)°, so that calibration of r is equivalent to calibration
of the rate of time preference of the representative household. Following King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988),
we calibrate rtomatch the average real return on the U.S. stock market. The parameter 6 represents the
exogenous rate of depreciation of the capital stock of the private non-energy sector. The model implies that
in a steady-state equilibrium, the share of investment in final uses and the share of capital in total costs




Hence the values assumed for g and r,andthe share parameters discussed below, imply a value for 6, which
is the one given. These parameters imply a steady-state capital-output ratio in the private non-energy sector
of 7.5 ejuarLers, which is reasonably consistent with the national income accounts as well.
The parameters 5c,aj,u represent the steady-state shares of private consumption expenditure, private
iiivestllsenL expenditure, and government purchases of private lion-energy output, respectively, in total final
—24of privaLe non-energy output. We calibrate these shares to equal the a4erage shares of these
three kinds of expenditure in U.S. private value added (GDF minus value added by the federal, state and
local governments). The parameters 1E, 5M, a15,5Krepresentthe steady-state shares of energy, materials,
alior sod capital coals, respectively, in the total costs of the private non-energy sector.





\V,.;,vcliIiie. somewhat arhitrarily, a share of mstcriahs coats of .5. This is somewhat smaller than the average
20materials shareindicated in the Commerce Departmentdata forU-S. manufacturing sectors, butwe suppose
that materials are a smaller fraction of coats outsideofmanufacturing.Theabove equation then implies
= .112. This leaves .48 of total costs for labor and capital coats. Insofar as wages account for shout 75%
nsf value added in the national income accounts, we set aw = .36, 5K.12.
As is explained in the text, we aume thai in the long run, the number of firms is such that equation 11
is satisfied. This implies that in the steady state, a, the share of fixed rests in total costa, must equal
N p-i (1 sE —5M) F(K,zH) =
Ilecireourcalibrationof this parameter follows from our choice of pm, discussed below. (Note that a. does
notrefer to coats in addiLion to the four rategnries previously listed. The fixed coats are a subset of the coats
already counted once as labor and capital costs.)
The calculations just explained imply that the abste Ø0i of total energy uae that is domestically produced
is .83. They also explain why we set i$, the ehare of total energy use that is direct household use, equal to
.4. The parameterindicating the steady-state value of H'/H', is set equal to .17, the average ratio of
government employment (summing employment by federal, state and local governments) to total employment
over the postwar period.
I'lus completes our specification of the parameters deacribimmg balanced growth. We turn next to the
remaining parameters of the production technology of the private non-energy sector. As the functions
17,F,P7 are all assumed to be homogeneous of degree one, the only parameters that occur in the log-linear
approximation to our equilibrium conditions are, in the case of each function, the elasticity of the function
with respect to each factor (only one free parameter per function as they must sum to 1) and the elasticity of
substitution between the two factora. The elasticities of subetitution enter the log-linear approximations to
thoec equilibrium conditions involving marginal products. All of these elasticities are evaluated at the factor
mix that uccura in the steady-state equilibrism. The elasticities with respect to the individual factors are
implied hr time steady-state share parameters already discussed; for example, the elasticity of P7 with respect
Lu F roust equal SE/(SE ÷ as;), and the elasticity of 17withrespect to V must equal 1 —is(sE+ sac). (It will
be obsereed that for both of time valuse of p that we uas, each of these elasticities is positive.) it thus remains
only Lu epenicy tlmr. elasticities of substitution. Time values given in Table 1 for roe and enem are based upon
ii ,,omuoimi,Criccsmimmmmcsreportedin time Appendix of Rotemh'rrg end \Voodfor,I (1093). 'lime value of 1 for
30r5n (which wouldfollowfrom a Cobb—Douglas production function for value added) is standard in thereal
biiuiics.s cycle literature and in a great many other computational general equilibrium studies.
We next consider the parametersofhousehold preferences. As noted above, the rate of Lime preference is
implicitly determined by our specification of r. It is useful to discuss the utility function U(A,H) interms
of the Friacli demand functions AJ(wA,A).Hh(ws,A)thatit implies, where w't denotes the "consistnption
wage" defined in section 2, end A denotes the representative household's marginal utility of wealth (with
wealth in units of the composite good A).In order for a steady-state balanced growth path to be possible,
it is necessary to make a homogeneity ssnumption on the Frisch demands.Specifically, we nunse that
there exists a e > 0 such that H'(w5,A)is homogeneons of degree nero in (ur,A/c), while A4(w-'4,A) is
homogeneous of degree one in (sA, A.U]. (This is the homogeneity assumption referred to in sections 1 and
2, that is important for the seauk that a tame on direct household use of energy has no effect on non-energy
output.) In our numerical work we furthermore specify the value of 2 for s. As is noted in Table 1, this
value implies that the elasticity of consumption growth (specifically, growth in consumption of tIme aggregate
A) between two periods, with respect to the real rate of return between those periods (also measured in
terms of the composite good A),holdinghours worked constani, is equal to 5. This value (which follows
ftotesuherg and Woodford (1993)) is within the range of values consistent with a variety of studies of the
relatiomm between intertempocal substitution in consumption and asset prices. (A value of 1 is common in
the real business cycle literature.)
The only features of the Friach demands that matter for the log-linear approximation to the equilibrium
conditions are the elasticities of the functions with respect to their two arguments, again evaluated at the
sceadystate equilibrium. Flowerer, the homogeneity assumption stated above implies that all four elasticities
arc uniquely Jeternined once we specify values for u and any one of the eloaticities. We choose to calibrate
lime modcl iii terms ofaspccifmed value for the elasticity of the Frisch labor supply fuoctioss with respect
to the consumptiou wage, because this particular elasticity (sometimes called the "intertemporal elasticity of
labor supply") is both faomiliar and the subject of a large number of econometric studies. Time value that we
m2yur domonotramian of hew she equilibriumconditions eanconveniently he wotLen n tenon of tue Frnob demand functions,
liomrrolier and W'oodford lissa). The discussion below of (lie manrn.meteriuation of the Friseh demand functionsfollows
flnmemi,bcrgnod Woodfoed 159921.
Ti1i0 is eqoivaleot in w bomnenoriiy assumption on the funetios U.Foefurther discussion of (ho class of functions U
ssi.isfyingibis coud,t,au, see Kine, Flower and fteheio (ieaa) or Roterimher sod Wsodfnrd 1i952).
.31assume (again following Elotemberg end Woodford (1903)) is at the high end nfthe range olvaluss obtained
front panel data studies, though it is considerably smalLer than the values mest often assumed in the real
business cycle literature (of Len 4 or more).
The remaining feature of household preferencestospecify is the sggregatnc function A(C,Es). Again,
because we assume that the function is homogeneous degree one, the only parameters for which numerical
values are needed see the elasticities of Awithrespect to its two arguments, and the elasticity of substitution
between the two arguments, again evaluated at the steady-state equilibrium consumption bundle. The
elasticities with respect to the arguments are again implied by the share parameters specified above. For
example the elasticity of Awithrespect to C is given by
C — sc(1 — SM)
ec(15sr)+r5a
'Ibisit remains only to specify Cop. Our value is taken from the econometric study by tlouthakker, Verleger
and Sheehan (1074).
'aVe finally describe the parameters that specify the product market structure. As noted in the text all of
the models that we considee amount to different specifications of the markup function p(X/Y) in equation
6.Thefeatures of this function that matter for the log-linear approximation to the equilibrium cossditious
are its vs lue p in the steady-state equilibrium arid the elasticity of this function with respect to U.s argument
X/Y, also evaluated at the steady-state value uf that argument. In the csae of the competitive model, we
specify p = t and c1, = I. In the case of the monopolistirally eompetitiee (or "constant markup") model,
we specify p1.2 and ç 0. In the case of the oligopulLstie (or "variable markup") model, we specify
p = 1.2 and = .15. As we discuss further in Rotemherg and Woodfurd (1992), the amount of market
power assumed in the steady slate in the case of the imperfectly competitive specifications (prices 20% in
•xccas of marginal cost) is seithiu the rauge of estimates obtained by a number of studies of U.S. industries.
lu that same paper we show that time implicit collusion model implies theoretical bounds upon the value of
namely, that 0 .c r5 < p — 1. The value that we assume here satisfies time theoretical bound. These
parsirieter values for the implicit cnlhssiun model also coincide with those that srs shown in Rotemberg and
\Voodford I 1011) to predict rlfects of oil price shocks dial are similar to those observed during the period
I 917-1080.
mm L lie vase of die oligopolistic mondel, it is also necessary to specify a value for the parauteter a whichappears in the deFinition of X provided in Rotembergand%Voodford(k992). This pararneteTindicates 11w
expectedrate of growth of a given oligopoly's share in total expenditure. We assume o =.9,because,asis
discussedin the Appendht of Rutemberg and Woodford(1992), this value isconsistenLwith the existence of an
equilibrium with imperfect collusion (a binding incentive compatibility constraint) in the case of oligopolies
with no more than ten firms.
Finally in the caseofeither of the imperfectly competitive models, we must specify the parameter p in
equation 13. We set this arbtharily at .2. This parameter does not seem to have an important qualitative
eFfect on our results as long as it is relatively small (adjustment of numher of firms is not too fast).
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For Electricity 800short tons
Other uses 100short tons 30/tou 3
Petroleum
Production 2707Million Barrels16.54/barrel 44.77
Imports 2223Million Barrels16.54/hacrel 36.77














g .03 Rate oftechnical progress (peryear)
.00Steady statereal rate ofreturn (per year)
6 073 Rate ofdepreciation of capital stock (per year)
.697 Shareof private consumptionin finaluses
.136Share of private investment in final uses
.117Shareof government purchases in final uses
.02 Share of energy costs in total coats
.5 Share of materials costs in total costs
.36 Share of labor costs in total costs
.12 Share of capital costs in total coats
• 0, .167 Shsreofflxedcoatsintotalcosts
.83 Share of domestically produced energy intotalenergy use
.4Share of direct household use in total energy use
.17 Share of hours hired by the government
.69 Elasticity of substitution hetween value added and intermediate inputs
casr .13 Elasticity of substitution between energy and materials
cEll I Elasticity of substitution between capital and hours
I/is .5Elasticity of intertemporal substitution of household expenditure
1.3 Intertemporal elasticity of labor supply
p 1, 1.2 Steady state markup (ratio of price to marginal cost)
0. .15 Elasticity of the markup with respect tu )/Y
cc .9 Expected rate of growth of individual oligopolys expenditure share
p .2 Rate of partial adjustment of number of linus
33Table 3
Long-Run Effects of an Energy Tax
TAX ON ALL ENERGY USE) (HOUSEHOLD USE ONLYI
Competitive Market Power CompetitiveMarket Power
Non-Energy Output -.071 -.097 I 0
CDI' -.072 -.098 -.022 -.022
Hours Worked -.024 -.021 0 0
Product Wage -.058 -.085 0 0
Consumption Wage -.092 -.122 -.057 -.037
Energy Use in Prod. -.271 -.297 0 0
household Energy —1.052 -1.082 -1.000 1.000
Cspit.al Stock -.084 -.110 0 0





































Energy tax increase: gradual implementation
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Competitive:-: constant mu: --variable mu: